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In recent decades several conspiracy theories became prominent topics of Polish public 
debate: the Smoleńsk catastrophe, “gender conspiracy” and “Jewish conspiracy” are 
some examples of such theories. These conspiracy theories can be viewed as 
manifestations of a collective conspiracy mentality, a collective mental state in which 
other groups, nations, or institutions are viewed as ill-intended and willing to conspire 
against the in-group. This state is instigated by salient historical representations of one’s 
own group (e.g., nation), viewing the in-group as a victim of others. It is boosted by a 
special kind of defensive in-group identity—collective narcissism. Finally, it bears 
negative consequences for inter-group relations. 
conspiracy theory, conspiracy mentality, collective threat, in-group victimization, 
collective narcissism, Jewish conspiracy theory, gender conspiracy 
 
Chapter 25 
The Collective Conspiracy Mentality in Poland 
Wiktor Soral, Aleksandra Cichocka, Michał Bilewicz, and Marta Marchlewska 
Poland is a country in which conspiracy beliefs seem ubiquitous in social and political 
life.1 Major political debates surround issues of potential foreign involvement in the death 
of the former president, liberal powers threatening the Catholic Church, or the Jewish 
conspiracy. One common thread is that they usually touch on how people perceive 
members of other groups. They are at the heart of one particular type of Polish national 
identity and are strongly related to the perceived role of Poles both in history and on the 
contemporary international stage. Therefore, work on conspiracy theories in Poland sheds 
light on the inter-group dimensions of conspiracy theories. 
Introduction 
Although past research does not necessarily neglect the importance of group 
identification in forming support for conspiracy theories, it  specific role in driving 
conspiracy beliefs requires more in-depth theoretical understanding. Conspiracy theories 
are an inseparable part of political and inter-group conflicts. Group members are often 
involved in clandestine actions directed against enemy groups, and expect that the enemy 
groups will act the same way. Thus, group members may cast unjustified accusations of 
alleged hostile plots, and detect real conspiracies as well. Whether justified or not, 
conspiracy theories are one of the main determinants of inter-group relations, peaceful or 
violent, especially in countries driven by the irresistible winds of history. Conspiracy 
 
theories influence not only how the out-group image is shaped but also how the collective 
self is construed. 
Poland is a country with a long history of fights against foreign powers and 
struggles for sovereignty, a country whose fate was determined by agreements of 
neighboring empires and global superpowers: in Petersburg in 1772, in Paris in 1919, in 
Moscow in 1939, and in Yalta in 1945.2 A brief look at Polish history and literature 
shows that many famous Poles were personally involved in some sort of clandestine plot 
of Polish patriots aimed at fighting the occupying forces. Yet, the majority of Poles tend 
to ascribe conspiratorial intrigues to members of disliked out-groups: Jews, Germans, or 
Russians.3 This tendency seems relatively stable over time. Such a form of collective 
conspiracy mentality can be considered a typical instance of siege mentality, a more 
general collective mental state in which other nations are viewed as hostile and 
negatively intended toward one’s own nation.4 
In this chapter we will cover different factors that can add up to forming a 
collective conspiracy mentality. Classical and recent studies conducted in Poland 
establish the contextual and personality-related factors triggering conspiracy theories 
popular among Poles. Particularly, belief in conspiracy theories can be regarded as a kind 
of defensive response to threats, which is observed especially at the level of relations 
between the in-group and the out-group. Conspiracy theories and in-group image are 
mutually related, and endorsement of conspiracy theories can affect attitudes toward 
others: out-group members, foreign institutions and authorities, and internal political 
actors and decisions they take. 
Threat, Uncertainty, and Belief in Conspiracy Theories 
 
Belief in conspiracy theories is frequently linked to perception that the social world is a 
dangerous, uncontrollable, and unpredictable place. General state anxiety—evoked 
simply by waiting for an examination—can lead to greater endorsement of conspiracy 
theories.5 Moreover, endorsement of conspiracy theories correlates positively with 
symptoms of paranoia, such as self-centered thought, suspiciousness, and assumptions of 
ill will and hostility.6 Given these findings, belief in conspiracies can be understood as 
one of the ways individuals use to manage their everyday fears and restore feelings of 
control and certainty.7 In line with this reasoning, Marchlewska, Cichocka, and 
Kossowska found in two studies conducted among Polish participants that people who 
are motivated to reduce feelings of uncertainty (i.e., those high in need for cognitive 
closure) rely on temporarily salient conspiracy theories, especially when they refer to 
mysterious events with unknown official explanations.8 This is probably an attempt to 
retain a sense of safety and predictability. 
However, reducing perceptions of threats or dangers via the endorsement of 
conspiracy theories seems to be ineffective in the long run.9 Rather than restoring a sense 
of control, the individual’s feelings of (political) powerlessness seem to increase after 
exposure to conspiracy theories.10 This reveals the paradoxical nature of conspiracy 
theories: On the one hand they can provide individuals with a sense of meaning and 
predictability, but on the other hand, conspiracy theories point to causal factors that by 
nature are unpredictable, uncontrollable, and hostile. Thus, exposure to conspiracy 
theories can actually increase perceptions of threats and dangers. For example, exposure 
to anti-vaccine conspiracy theories increases the belief that vaccines are dangerous to 
children.11 All this by no means indicates that individuals who endorse conspiracy 
 
theories inevitably end up in a state of hopelessness and alienation. Rather, they seem to 
be pushed toward extremist views, radical authoritarian leaders, and fundamentalist 
groups.12 
The link between the belief in a dangerous world and the endorsement of 
conspiracy theories is particularly evident among individuals with high levels of right-
wing authoritarianism (RWA). According to recent reformulations of the classical 
concept of authoritarianism, the belief in a dangerous world is one of the main 
characteristics of individuals with high RWA.13 Driven by this belief, individuals scoring 
high on RWA tend to adopt positive attitudes toward coercive social control, obedience 
and respect for existing authorities, and conforming to traditional and religious norms and 
values. These solutions allow for establishing and maintaining collective security, order, 
cohesion, and stability. Presumably, a conviction about the ubiquity of conspiracies is a 
part of a worldview maintained by individuals high in RWA. Indeed, studies by 
Grzesiak-Feldman and colleagues conducted in the Polish context consistently 
demonstrated positive correlations between RWA and beliefs in conspiratorial intentions 
of out-groups that tend to be considered threatening by Poles: Jews, Arabs, Germans, and 
Russians.14 
Therefore, the role of conspiracy theories in restoring feelings of certainty, 
predictability, and personal control seems to be palliative at best.15 These negative 
feelings seem to trigger belief in conspiratorial intentions of out-groups, but the 
mechanism does not provide the ultimate solution to everyday fears. 
Conspiracy Theories and In-Group Image 
 
While the individual has no chance in confrontation with hidden plots, there is a chance 
that powerful and united collective can effectively face its enemies. This means that 
ultimately conspiracy theories should be regarded as collective phenomena, and more 
attention should be devoted to the relation between conspiracy theories and how in-group 
and out-group representations are construed. Particularly, historical representations of 
Poles as victims versus dissidents, as well as a defensive type of national identification, 
are known to be related to the belief in conspiracy theories. 
In-Group as a Shield against Conspiracies: The Role of In-Group 
Victimhood 
On April 10, 2010, a plane crashed in Smoleńsk (Russia) a kilometer short of the runway 
in foggy weather conditions, killing all passengers including Polish president Lech 
Kaczynski and 95 other important political figures. Since then, Polish society has been 
regularly confronted with a multitude of conspiracy explanations for the catastrophe.16 
Among numerous theories the most prominent were those of artificial fog supposedly 
cast by Russians around the Smoleńsk airport, but also unconfirmed reports of possible 
use of a fuel-air bomb on the deck of the airplane.17 According to these conspiracy 
theories both Polish and Russian authorities were responsible for the Smoleńsk crash—
which, according to official explanations, resulted from bad planning and pure 
coincidence. 
In 2013, 25% of Poles believed that the catastrophe was a result of a conspiracy of 
Polish and Russian authorities, and nearly 50% believed that Polish and Russian 
authorities are trying to conceal the true cause of the catastrophe. According to a very 
recent survey conducted by the Center for Research on Prejudice, the percent of Poles 
 
endorsing Smoleńsk conspiracy in 2017 is almost unchanged, with 28% of Poles 
believing in it.18 Soral and Grzesiak-Feldman pointed that even those individuals that do 
not believe in the assassination attempt are distrustful toward the authorities with respect 
to the official explanations of the catastrophe.19 Interestingly, conspiracy theories of the 
Smoleńsk catastrophe seem to be endorsed especially by those at the conservative end of 
political spectrum, but also by those with liberal views, albeit to smaller degree. In 
general, the conspiracy theories of Smoleńsk are endorsed by those at the extremes of the 
political spectrum rather by those with centrist views.20 
In popular discourse, the Smoleńsk catastrophe is often viewed as a breaking 
point that was followed by a significant change in the Polish society. The Smoleńsk 
catastrophe and related conspiracy theories have raised questions about who controls 
world events. They have diminished trust in the efficacy of the ruling party and 
highlighted the possibility of hidden, hostile out-groups lurking nearby. Such challenges 
were likely to increase strivings to obtain information that would allow people to see the 
in-group as a “shield” protecting them from threats. Studies by Soral and Kofta provide 
initial support for this hypothesis, suggesting that perception of collective threats 
increases cognitive accessibility of traits related to in-group agency.21 
Hence, the conservative shift observed—especially among Polish youths—after 
the rise of conspiracy theories of the Smoleńsk catastrophe is likely a result of a more 
basic striving to restore safety and control through collective means.22 A recent small 
study by Soral traced the Internet popularity of topics that would present Poles as actively 
resisting enemy forces, prior to and after the Smoleńsk catastrophe.23 Two such topics 
were selected: the “cursed soldiers” and the Warsaw Uprising of 1944. The term cursed 
 
soldiers refers commonly to guerrilla movements that operated in Poland right after 
World War II, and actively resisted the communist authorities supported by the Soviet 
Union. These partisan movements are nowadays one of the most controversial symbols of 
a Polish fight for sovereignty and against the oppressing forces. In turn, the Warsaw 
Uprising was a major WWII operation of Polish resistance to liberate the Polish capital 
from German occupation. Figure 25.1 depicts annual trends of the popularity of these 
topics on Polish Wikipedia.24 The trends clearly depict the date of April 10, 2010 as a 
tipping point, followed by an exponential growth of popularity of both topics on the 
Wikipedia website. 
[Insert Figure 25.1 about here] 
This rapid increase in popularity of these topics is not solely an aftermath of the 
Smoleńsk catastrophe, depicted frequently as an example of collective trauma. Rather, we 
would argue, it is strictly related to growing levels of distrust and anxiety driven by 
ubiquitous conspiracy theories surrounding the Smoleńsk catastrophe. Conspiracy 
theories, presented as threatening narratives, deprive the individual of very basic needs 
for security and control. In such instances individuals are more prone to look for agentic 
groups and leaders who might promise to act as a buffer against the overwhelming threat 
and fight fire with fire.25 
The Smoleńsk catastrophe took place on the exact anniversary of another well-
known national trauma, the assassination of Polish military officers in the Katyń forest in 
1940. Passengers of 2010 flight were traveling to attend anniversary commemorations in 
the Katyń forest. This context stresses another important component of Polish in-group 
image: perception of in-group victimization. Studies conducted in Poland after the 
Smoleńsk catastrophe found that a focus on the in-group’s victimhood (either measured 
 
or experimentally induced) increased Poles’ support for conspiracy explanation of the 
Smoleńsk catastrophe, and this was particularly true among participants highly identified 
as Poles.26 This suggests that the narratives of past group victimhood create a propensity 
for interpreting current events in a conspiratorial way. Hence, the need to interpret 
political events in conspiratorial way might be especially strong for those with chronic 
beliefs that the in-group is threatened or victimized. 
In-Group Positivity and Conspiracy Beliefs 
A threatened sense of Polish national identity predicts belief in conspiracy theories about 
out-group members. One line of research focuses on the associations between the 
endorsement of conspiracy theories and collective narcissism—an unrealistic belief in the 
greatness of an in-group, associated with the need to validate the in-group image in the 
eyes of others.27 Collective narcissism is a defensive type of in-group identification, 
linked to an increased sensitivity to inter-group threats.28 
Cichocka et al. examined the links between national collective narcissism and 
beliefs that other groups are purposefully conspiring against the Polish people.29 In one 
study, Polish collective narcissism was associated with the endorsement of conspiracy 
theories about the Smoleńsk crash. This relationship was driven by the perception that the 
fate of the Polish nation was threatened. Another study examined people’s reactions to 
the celebration of the fall of the Berlin Wall in Germany on November 9, 1989. Although 
for other nations the demolition of the Berlin Wall often serves as the symbol of the fall 
of the Iron Curtain, Polish people tend to take pride in the role played by the Solidarity 
movement and the partially free elections of June 4, 1989 in fighting the communist 
regime. Indeed, some people seem to believe there is an international conspiracy aimed at 
 
undermining Polish achievements in combating communism, and this belief was stronger 
for those high in national collective narcissism. 
The links between national collective narcissism and beliefs in out-group 
conspiracies were originally derived from the observation of Polish political rhetoric. 
However, further research demonstrated that they extend beyond the Polish context. For 
example, another study by Cichocka et al. was conducted in the United States and 
examined beliefs about conspiratorial actions of foreign (out-group) versus one’s own 
(in-group) governments.30 While American collective narcissism was associated with a 
belief that foreign governments were involved in conspiratorial actions, it was unrelated 
to the endorsement of conspiracy theories that assumed involvement of the American 
government.31 
Overall, research shows that conspiratorial explanations of inter-group events are 
linked to the need to defend the undermined or victimized in-group image. However, not 
all forms of in-group identity are necessarily threatened or defensive. In all three studies 
by Cichocka et al., national identification without the defensive, narcissistic component 
was associated with lower endorsement of out-group conspiracy theories.32 Thi  effect 
was especially clear once the variance shared between collective narcissism and in-group 
identification was accounted for. Such non-narcissistic national in-group positivity was a 
negative predictor of out-group conspiracy beliefs, due to lower perceptions of threat to 
the in-group. 
In general, research conducted in the Polish context and beyond indicates that 
conspiracy theories are linked to the way the in-group image is construed. This is 
probably not surprising if we consider that conspiracy theories are often defined as 
 
beliefs about hostile actions of out-group members that plot to harm the in-group.33 In the 
next section we review work examining ways in which the conspiring out-groups are 
portrayed and what kind of action against the conspiring out-group the threatened in-
group is ready to take. 
Conspiracy Theories and Out-Group Image 
Although conspiracy theories are certainly driven by in-group-based motivations and 
image concerns, their content is mostly devoted to ill-intended out-group members. Kofta 
and Sędek coined the term conspiracy stereotypes to denote perceptions of conspiring 
out-groups.34 Conspiracies attributed to out-groups have detrimental consequences for 
inter-group relations, leading to prejudice, animosity, and conflict. Two such conspiracy 
stereotypes play a crucial role in Polish discourse: Jewish conspiracy theories and the 
gender conspiracy theory. 
Jewish Conspiracy Theories 
Although Jewish conspiracy theories date back to the beginning of the nineteenth 
century, they are still endorsed by almost half of Polish society. Figure 25.2 shows the 
results of a survey conducted on a representative sample of Polish adults in 2017 by the 
Center for Research on Prejudice.35 Among other topics, participants in the survey were 
asked about their attitudes toward different claims related to Jewish conspiracy theories. 
Almost half of the sample (a plurality) agreed with such statements (see Figure 25.1). 
[Insert Figure 25.2 about here] 
Beliefs in Jewish conspiracy are rooted in the same identity structures as other 
forms of conspiracy beliefs. They are more often observed among people high in national 
collective narcissism, with a strong sense of victimhood and group deprivation.36 
 
Additionally, there are clear situational triggers of such beliefs. The effects on prejudice 
of conspiracy stereotypes about Jews are stronger in times of parliamentary elections—
that is, when feelings of uncertainty and lack of control seem to be on the rise—an effect 
found both in longitudinal studies using student samples and in nationwide representative 
sample studies.37 
The effects of conspiracy stereotypes on hostile intentions, prejudice, and 
discrimination are particularly evident if we look at those who believe in the Jewish 
conspiracy theory. For example, Golec de Zavala and Cichocka conducted a survey 
examining the psychological concomitants of anti-Semitism in Poland.38 They found that 
endorsing the conspiracy stereotype of Jews was associated with higher anti-Semitic 
prejudice (expressed for example in higher social distance toward Jews). Furthermore, 
both the conspiracy stereotype and anti-Semitic beliefs were predicted by national 
collective narcissism. In a more detailed study of prejudicial consequences of such 
beliefs, Bilewicz et al. found that belief in Jewish conspiracy theory predicts support for 
the enforcement of discriminatory laws against Jews, an unwillingness to accept Jews as 
neighbors or co-workers, and biases in donations to Jews.39 Further studies showed that 
even in a behavioral decision-making task, participants who believed in Jewish 
conspiracy theory distributed less money to Jewish organizations. The belief in Jewish 
conspiracy theory has clearly the strongest discriminatory consequence. 
The Gender Conspiracy 
Belief in the “gender conspiracy” is a relatively recent phenomenon in Polish public 
discourse, visible mostly in the Catholic media and among far-right-wing political 
movements.40 According to this belief, gender theory or gender studies—officially 
 
presented as transdisciplinary areas of research that engage critically with gender norms, 
relations, or identities—are not what they seem to be.41 This “is a classic example of an 
ideology, it is a tool in a ruthless fight for benefits for the atheistic gender and homo-
lobby,” said Catholic priest DariuszOko, the leading proponent of this conspiracy theory, 
in one of his interviews. He also claimed that gender studies will destroy the Catholic 
Church and introduce a totalitarian regime controling all aspects of human life and 
promoting “sex mania, genocide, destruction of the family and brutal sexualization of 
children.”42 In line with this theory, Catholics are under threat and should prepare 
themselves to fight against the ruthless representatives of gender studies. 
Slogans proclaimed by gender conspiracy believers, such as “. . . gender is 
supported by all enemies of God and religion” r “defend the homeland against 
totalitarian genderism,” were endorsed by many Poles.43 Research conducted by 
Marchlewska et al. showed that the likelihood of endorsing the “gender conspiracy” 
theory was positively predicted by Catholic collective narcissism but not religiosity per 
se, replicating the pattern of results obtained in the previous studies on defensive 
(narcissistic)in-group positivity as a positive predictor of belief in out-group 
conspiracies.44 Furthermore, Marchlewska et al. showed that adopting gender conspiracy 
beliefs was positively related to hostile intentions toward non-Catholics. For example, 
people high in gender conspiracy beliefs declared that “ ey would not hesitate to fight 
against those who undermine the positive image of Catholicism,” ndicating that 
conspiracy theories lead not only to individual maladaptiveness but also to inter-group 
aggression. 
 
Conspiracy theories about out-groups—conspiracy stereotypes—are not merely 
beliefs about ill-intended out-group members, but rather they are perceptions of other 
groups understood as ontologically separate, agentic forces.45 The Jewish and gender 
conspiracy theories not only target out-group members but also artificial social 
constructs. Both refer to some sinister powers whose sole purpose is bringing chaos and 
harm to the in-group, whether it is through destroying traditional Catholic values or 
controling the world’s economy. 
The overarching concept of collective conspiracy mentality helps to explain why 
group members tend to endorse various logically unrelated conspiracy beliefs. Their 
primary role is to point to other groups, nations, or institutions as ill-intended and willing 
to conspire against the in-group. This urge stems from a threatened or victimized sense of 
national identity and may be motivated by group defensive mechanisms. 
How to Overcome the Collective Conspiracy Mentality? 
In this chapter we aimed to describe the most popular contemporary conspiracy theories 
in Poland: the Smoleńsk catastrophe conspiracy theories and the “gender conspiracy” 
theories, as well as the historical (yet still endorsed by the majority of the Polish society) 
Jewish conspiracy theory. The common basis of Polish conspiracy beliefs seems to be the 
presence of a strong collective component. The conspiracy theories can be viewed as a 
manifestation of more general collective mentality in which other nations are viewed as 
hostile toward one’s own nation. Inspired by works on siege mentality, we name such a 
mental state collective conspiracy mentality.46 
Future work should focus on further examining these processes both from the 
theoretical and applied perspective. A key theoretical challenge is to investigate the 
 
causal mechanisms linking identity, conspiracy theories, and inter-group relations as well 
as the long-term consequences of the collective conspiracy mentality. The collective 
conspiracy mentality involves intra-group motivations instigated by feelings of existential 
threats and (realistic or fictitious) beliefs about in-group victimization. These motivations 
are likely to occur among those vigilant to social or inter-group threats. Driven by the 
threats, some individuals tend to construct the social world, and out-groups more 
specifically, as hostile and untrustworthy. At the same time, these individuals might 
construct their in-group as a shield protecting them from external threats and dangers. It 
is easy to see, however, that the role of such social representations seems to be palliative 
at best. In fact, the process resembles a sort of vicious circle resulting in (often 
transgenerational) maintenance of conspiracy beliefs, inter-group suspicion, and conflict. 
Future work should then also focus on identifying ways in which these processes can be 
attenuated. Developing interventions that could decrease the defensiveness associated 
with collective conspiracy mentality would likely contribute to more constructive inter-
group relations both within the Polish society and in other contexts where suspicion and 
threat drive inter-group attitudes. 
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